


## WARNING!

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

---

# Building Military Relations in Africa

LTC Karl E. Prinslow  
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.



---

*"ERC projects will be submitted to the Joint Staff for approval and funding based upon the extent that the projects ... Promote U.S. national interests."*<sup>1</sup>

Because of reduced funding for security assistance, Exercise Related Construction (ERC) projects are an example of how U.S. military relations with foreign militaries will take place in the future. ERC is defined as "an unspecified minor construction project, outside CONUS, in support of an in-progress, or planned, CJCS exercise that results in a facility or facilities that remain, in any part, after the end of the exercise."<sup>2</sup> Small unit commanders and staffs will conduct this type of operation and as such will have a more important role in the execution of the military element of U.S. foreign policy and the accomplishment of our military strategy than when conducting a comparable exercise at home station, at the Combat Training Centers or during a reserve component annual training period.

The DOD program for Exercise Related Construction is an excellent vehicle by which sound relations with present and potential coalition partners can be developed. It is also a superior program by which the American soldier and his leaders can support the nation's peacetime engagement policy. These exercises are important because they place Army units in a position to use their skills to support regional combatant commanders. Exercise Related Construction (ERC) projects are proposed by the Unified Commands and funded by Congress to build facilities in support of U.S. military exercises overseas. Combined exercises, of which ERC is one, are used principally to improve the military capabilities of American and allied forces in furtherance of mutual interests such as preparation for coalition warfare. The lessons developed through these exercises are instructive for future operations not only in East Africa but throughout the world.

This article describes a 1996 Exercise Related Construction project in Kenya and identifies pitfalls to avoid in planning and the conduct of future exercises. It demonstrates how building a live fire range combined with its humanitarian and medical assistance projects, improved the operational readiness of the military participants, the health and welfare of the people of the host nation and helped re-vitalize lagging military to military relations between the United States and Kenya. This exercise situation was unique for the US military for the following reasons:

- No combined exercises had been conducted with Kenya in over six years, and the intervening years were fraught with inter-governmental tensions that made future exercises problematic.
- The U.S. and Kenyan military worked with one another in a combined exercise, sharing responsibilities, expertise, and Command and Control.

- The extensive scope of the exercise - deployment by sea and air to East Africa, ground movement of equipment over 500 miles one way, building a live fire range and two dormitories and conducting a medical civic assistance project. These were all fully integrated into the host nation's existing plans.
- The exercise was completed without serious accident or injury.
- The exercise encouraged mutual respect among participants and raised expectations and anticipation of future combined cooperation.

### ***U.S. Military Interaction in Kenya***

The country of Kenya is the southern most nation in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). US-Kenya military relations date to a mid-1970's request by Kenya for a US military survey of Kenyan defense requirements. The result was a blueprint of support, cooperation and a long term acquisition and modernization plan. The personnel of the initial training and maintenance teams evolved into the Kenya U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO), a US Central Command (CENTCOM) security assistance liaison office. The KUSLO organization and US military access to Kenyan facilities were formalized by the early 1980's government to government "access agreement."<sup>3</sup> The subsequent construction for the U.S. military of dock facilities in the main port and a warehouse and parking ramp at the international airport in the coastal city of Mombasa further enhanced US presence in Kenya. Extensive United States military assistance to Kenya in the 1980's resulted in a high level of appreciation for American financial support and a reliance, if not dependency, on this largesse as evidenced by a lack of Kenyan national funding for the FMS equipped units.<sup>4</sup>

The end of the cold war shifted American priorities and viewpoints, and in the late 1980's Kenya came under closer scrutiny by members of Congress for its human rights record. The outcome was 1991 legislation and later US government policy prohibiting additional FMF loans to Kenya and restricting the use of the funds already allocated until a demonstrated improvement in human rights practices. In 1992, Congress also effected a rescission of Kenya's unused grant money (\$9.6 million) to pay for the Los Angeles earthquake emergency management costs.

This dramatic shift in policy and "cold-turkey" cutoff of funds dismayed the Kenyan military which actions caused Kenya to question United States' credibility and reliability as a partner after two decades of cooperation. Virtually all forms of official military interaction and assistance were restricted or terminated in other cases. US military training exercises in Kenya during the period 1990-1995 were also canceled. Sour relations were exacerbated by a U.S. desire to utilize Kenyan facilities, granted by the 12 year old access agreement, to conduct military contingency operations - evacuations from Mogadishu, humanitarian operations and famine relief in the Horn of Africa in 1992-93, U.S. and UN operations in Somalia 1992-1995, evacuation of US personnel and others from Rwanda in 1994, and humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda in 1994.

In late FY1995, to revitalize a working relationship with the Kenyan military and enhance Kenya's place as a potential coalition partner, the CENTCOM CINC directed his staff to prepare for the conduct of an exercise in Kenya. He reinforced this effort with an Exercise Related Construction (ERC) project of an infantry squad live fire assault course to be built at the Kenya Army School of Infantry at Isiolo, Kenya. Construction was proposed for May-August 1996 to coincide with the reserve component's preferred time frame for Annual Training.

As the US Army Central Command's engineer command, the 416th Engineer Command received the mission for the ERC project and assigned the task to the 368th Engineer Battalion (Construction), one of its wartrace units.<sup>5</sup> The 368th Engineer battalion is a US Army Reserve unit headquartered in Manchester, NH.

## ***Project Planning and Execution***

This project was given a budget of \$175,000. This addresses only the cost of project materials and the operational cost of the equipment working on the project. Deployment and planning costs were covered by the respective commands' operating and maintenance budgets.

To this point, October 1995, the proposal for this project was wholly an American initiative and the Kenyan leadership and staffs had not had the reason nor the time to review and consider the idea as had the American commands. USCINCENT sent his exercise request to the host nation, via the CENTCOM office in Kenya (KUSLO), through an embassy diplomatic note to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by letter to the Kenya Department of Defence. These are important steps that one must take. Given the strained relations of previous years, the mechanics of notification and approval were an important learning process in protocol for the KUSLO as well as the host nation Kenya Department of Defence (KDOD). In a country like Kenya, whose military strongly clings to the tenets of civilian control, guidance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Office of the President is required prior to engaging in any agreements for activities with a foreign military. Because of uncertainty over the status of the access agreement, the Kenyan military felt the need to treat carefully any American overtures.

The Kenya U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO) had unofficial discussions with key Kenyan military personnel many months prior concerning hypothetical combined training opportunities. This included the provision of training literature so that the Kenya Army and Department of Defence would better understand what the proposed facilities and their components look like and how the US Army uses them for training. Considering Kenyan budget constraints, a cut-off of FMF loan funds, the low operational readiness of their FMS purchased equipment and the accompanying lack of training with that equipment, the KUSLO advanced the idea of working together on the ERC project as a high quality training opportunity for the Kenya Army.

While the Americans involved in exercises like this understand that they have a mission to accomplish the same assumption cannot be made of the host nation. Thus, the first Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS#1) was not until early December 1995 but began prior to the Kenyan military having a chance to get exercise approval. The key to a successful Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) is having representatives from all elements involved in the actual deployment and identifying the host nation offices and personnel with whom they will need to coordinate.<sup>6</sup> Unlike training at home station or at a Combat Training Center, one cannot expect or assume ready access to the host nation staff members that will be required to facilitate coordination. The more the US military liaison office understands about the proposed project the better they will be able to provide interface with the host nation military and government.

## ***Expanded Mission***

At the start of the PDSS site survey, the planning team informed the KUSLO that the ARCENT Commander had allocated funds for an Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) project and a Medical Civic Assistance Project (MEDCAP). In addition to this project expansion, the KUSLO made it clear that, in the eyes of the American embassy, success equals Kenyan military participation, and more is better.

At the end of the first PDSS, the mission had expanded due to the positive reception on the part of the host nation military and the local civil authorities. Examples of the expanded mission are: The American planners concluded that Kenya Army transport of US personnel and material was the most cost effective option and both the American Embassy and Kenyan military wanted greater Kenyan participation. The

local civil authorities proposed a HCA project of building two 80 person dormitories, that could be accomplished only by a combined effort of both US and Kenyan engineers. The US planners agreed to fund a water well at the School of Infantry to support the ERC project and took under consideration another well at the HCA site. The US planners also agreed to reproduce Kenya Army 1:50,000 scale maps that the US required. A Medical Civic Assistance (MEDCAP) project to support the Isiolo District Medical Officer's annual immunization program was also identified.<sup>7</sup>



*The foundation for one of two 80-man dormitories takes shape during a 1996 US-Kenya ERC project.*

### ***Expect Confusion***

Exercise planners must anticipate and be prepared for confusion and prepare to defeat it by effective coordination and insisting on frequent senior level contact. The PDSS#1 discovered a mis-understanding by the Deputy Commander of the Kenya Army that the U.S. was to build a tank gunnery range. This revelation illustrates the difficulty in making clear the scope of work to the host nation and reliance on host nation staff officers that may result in garbled messages and a delayed approval process.

Another lesson to learn is that a definition of readiness and operational standards can be clouded in cultural interpretation tempered by reality. U.S. concerns about the operational readiness of the Kenya Army transport unit vehicles were raised. The unit commanders were insistent on their ability to cross the line of departure with functioning vehicles. However, their enthusiasm to participate in the training exercise was not just for the professionalism it would engender or the valuable experience it would offer, but also for the "replacement in kind" of parts and materials used during the conduct of the exercise. It was believed by both the American planners and the Kenya Army units that as a result of the



replacement in kind agreement the vehicles and equipment that participates in the exercise would be at a higher state of readiness upon exercise completion than at its start.

### ***Replacement in Kind***

The Kenya Army viewed participation in this exercise as a valuable training opportunity, but one in which they would be limited by an annual budget that did not include or anticipate this increased operational tempo.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, a source of funding for using their equipment and personnel was a concern. The American interest in conducting training with foreign militaries is supported by the ability to fund the cost of their participation via the "Replacement in Kind" of repair parts for equipment that participates in the exercise. This was planned for by a written memorandum of understanding/agreement for "Replacement in Kind" of fuels, parts and scheduled maintenance services for the Kenya Army in support of or in the conduct of this training exercise.

Furnishing "replacement in kind" can become a very emotional issue rife with land mines of misunderstanding and misperception. This exercise detonated some of those mines. Making clear to the host nation what is and is not to be furnished and the mechanism by which it is furnished is essential. It is equally important to verify what cannot be provided and the U.S. limitation on liability for damaged equipment. Sufficient time for the host nation to review, discuss and gain approval of proposals must be allowed. An approach that places American military legal review as more paramount than the foreign nation's opportunity to conduct a similar review will de-rail the positive relationship that one seeks. American participants cannot spend too much time and effort working with the host nation military and the American liaison office to ensure that all parties understand the promises and limitations of the commitments. The American liaison office is key to this effort because it can help all parties understand each other's interpretations of the agreement.

The exercise's expanded mission necessitated additional discussions and coordination via a PDSS#2 during which the American planners visited the port of Mombasa to coordinate for and plan for the equipment arrival. Concurrent with the planning for this exercise were similar efforts for two Special Forces exercises which were scheduled to occur simultaneously in the vicinity of the ERC project.<sup>9</sup> These additional site surveys also provided more opportunities to coordinate exercise activities with the civil and military authorities. Through these additional contacts a clearer understanding was reached as to the capabilities and limitations of the MEDCAP program as well as issues concerning location of water wells, electrical power supplies and proposed modifications to the design of the construction projects.

The PDSS#2 concluded with an approved concept for U.S. and Kenya operations. The Kenya Army planned to drill two water wells, provide transport of U.S. personnel and some U.S. equipment and organize and conduct all road convoys. The conclusions reached by the planners about the Kenya Army commitments were later reinforced by Kenya Department of Defence and Army orders to their units assigning them the mission of exercise participation.<sup>10</sup>

### ***Country Team Participation***

Contact and introductions with the embassy staff (referred to as the 'country team') can be as important to mission success as contact with the host nation officials. On the country team, one can find the US civil government equivalents of all that one finds in a U.S. Army division. Depending on the compatibility of personalities involved and adherence to, or ignorance of applicable regulations, the country team can assist the military planners in matters ranging from information about the host nation, medical requirements and to all nature of logistics and financial functions. During the PDSS#2 a member of the American planning team briefed the full country team at a weekly "expanded country

team" meeting. Because of the professionalism with which this briefing was presented and its clear articulation of the exercise objective and concept, emphasizing the humanitarian and medical programs, it won over many skeptics that did not realize the wide scope of Army capabilities available to support the Ambassador's country plan. The success of this briefing helped substantially to gain a willingness on the part of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Peace Corps representatives to discuss cooperation with future military exercises, if only in sharing suggestions for future ERC, MEDCAP and HCA projects.



*An Army Engineer discusses the ERC project's progress with local civil authorities.*

### ***Host Nation Coordination***

A host nation LNO needs to have the authority and be in a position to effect coordination with the decision making body of the exercising unit or military service. Following the PDSS#2, the KUSLO felt that insufficient and ineffective coordination with the host nation military was occurring and sought assistance from the Kenya Army headquarters directly rather than through the Kenya Department of Defence. Because Kenyan participation was mostly logistical, the Kenya Army Commander had assigned this exercise to the Deputy Army Commander for Administration and Logistics. When the KUSLO discussed with his office the problems they were experiencing, an exercise liaison officer was appointed. Owing to the LNO's past experience, his knowledge of U.S. Army procedures and access to the Kenyan DOD communications system and Kenya Army decision makers, all coordination became more efficient and effective. With the Kenya Army LNO, the KUSLO knew they had a competent and capable officer who adopted and internalized the exercise success as his own. Although each PDSS had been assigned a Kenyan liaison officer, it was only an additional duty. Also, the officers were not senior enough to intercede directly at the level of the Kenya Army leadership and were working on only a proposed exercise vice one which the government of Kenya had approved. The newly assigned Kenya Army headquarters LNO swept away these shortcomings.

PDSS#3 was conducted to finalize the convoy movement order for the deployment of personnel and equipment and to initiate contracts for goods and services. The idea of US military personnel driving US military equipment across the breadth of the country of Kenya was novel and not expected to be approved by the government of Kenya given that it disallowed the same during the humanitarian relief operations for Rwanda in 1994. Because the Kenya Army is more familiar with the Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) of intra-theater movements and convoy operations in Kenya, the Kenya Army Transport Battalion had the task to plan, coordinate and conduct the convoys, to include those in which US personnel would drive US military vehicles. This provided a more equitable distribution of responsibility for mission success (Kenya Army having command and control for the construction of the water wells and transport; US Army had command and control of the construction work).

### ***Conduct of the Exercise***

The exercising unit deployed its equipment in April and advance party personnel in late May 1996. The advance party received the equipment, moved it to the base camp, set-up the base camp and verified completion of pre-construction work. Three 17 day rotations of personnel then built the Infantry Squad Battle Course, two dormitories, conducted the MEDCAP and prepared for re-deployment. After opening ceremonies, the facilities were turned over to the Kenyan military and civil authorities. All work was ultimately completed on time and within budget. Several important insights were gained as a result of the combined exercise.

### ***Command and Control***

Some American soldiers have the idea that they cannot take direction from or be under the command of foreign nation's officers. In this exercise command relationships were clearly delineated, and sometimes the Kenyan military was in command. For example, there was only one convoy commander and it was the Kenya Army Transport unit commander. Expressions to have both an American and a Kenyan convoy commander were silenced by the KUSLO in the interest of (a) recognizing and expressing support of the Kenya Army officer's ability, authority and responsibility in a shared endeavor and (b) to follow the "unity of command" principle of war. However, the Kenyan convoy commander was persuaded to include numerous details peculiar to American needs in his plans, such as the US Army safety requirements and regulations, local knowledge and customs of the area, the terrain and other requirements that are well known to the Kenya Army but novel to the American driver.

### ***Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Participation***

Early inclusion of MTMC planning and operations personnel in the exercise planning process is an important lesson to learn. MTMC has husbanding contracts in place at many ports around the world to include Mombasa, Kenya. These contracts include or can easily be modified to include off-loading of ships and inland transport of the cargo. Knowledge of this contract would not have negated the interest in having the Kenya Army supervise and conduct the convoys but would have relieved all parties of some stressful negotiations for inland container transport.

### ***Written Agreements***

This exercise proved MOUs to be invaluable as supportive planning documents, not insurance policies. The KUSLO was reluctant to require a written memorandum of understanding or agreement for the accomplishment of this project, fearing that it would be misconstrued as a lack of faith or trust. Written MOU's later proved to be valuable in reminding all parties as to what the plans and programs called for in subsequent sub-projects. For example, the Kenya Army assigned its Engineer Brigade the mission of constructing two water wells using materials purchased by the U.S. Army as part of the ERC project.

Despite what the KUSLO thought was a close working relationship with this unit and its Commander, misunderstandings still occurred as to who was responsible for what portions of the work and the time frame with which it must be accomplished. Subsequently, MOU's resolved this dilemma.

### ***Contracting Officer***

The American interpretation and understanding of the provisions of an international agreement do not mean that its implementation will be handled in the American style. Although a US-Kenya agreement permits the duty and tax free purchase of materials by the US military, the modalities of how this is to transpire were not understood by the KUSLO prior to deployment. The magnitude of the administration required by the government of Kenya to affect this exemption was burdensome for the few contract officers that deployed. The embassy procurement section did not have the personnel to adequately support this large an effort. A method to preclude this additional expense or administration in countries with which the US has similar agreements would be to purchase goods and services through the host nation department of defense. The other lesson of note, is that regardless of how well the US liaison office thinks they know the host nation, it is prudent for the unit planners to verify administrative, logistical and financial functions that the liaison office does not normally or routinely handle.

### ***Work Schedules and Other Cultural Differences***

In the conduct of a combined exercise, with the opportunity to work beside a foreign nation's military personnel and staff, one must be prepared to accommodate the differences in each other's work habits, customs and definition of various military specialities. One must also understand the view towards the exercise or project held by the other soldiers. The planners and military liaison office should thoroughly coordinate these matters before the soldiers arrive. However, soldiers working alongside one another on a common project will rapidly create a bond faster and more lasting than any staff officer can coordinate.

### ***MEDCAP Planning and Conduct***

More important than simply coming to a foreign nation and depositing a large amount of material and exercise activity, not to be seen again, the medical activities need to be integrated into the annual plan of the host nation regional medical officer. During PDSS#1 the Isiolo District Medical Officer (DMO) was informed of the American desire to assist him in his district, giving something to the people of Kenya. The most difficult part of coordination with the DMO was ensuring that he and his staff understood the limitations on use of the funds and materials that those funds could purchase. As a result of the MEDCAP's resources, it was able to accomplish much of the DMO's annual immunization plan for which he did not otherwise have funding or other resources.

MEDCAP activities are invaluable for the goodwill they create towards the US and the host nation government/military, albeit perhaps only in the region where military training is routinely conducted. However, without being able to rely on the annual presence of the American medical personnel and their logistics, the value to the local people can be fleeting. Thus, MEDCAPs should be prepared to support the foreign nation's ministry of health at large or have the resources to move over a larger region and thus spread the health care across a wide area.

The Kenya military medical corps was reluctant to become involved with the American military due to uncertainty over the status of the inter-governmental access agreement. This reluctance can be used as a yardstick by which to judge future relations via exercise involvement.

### ***PAO and Civil Military Affairs***



The small unit commander or staff officer must work with the local civil authorities when participating in foreign exercises. This person must raise civil-military relations to a far higher level of interest and daily concern than during a comparable training exercise at a US military facility.

Planning did not call for civil affairs or psyop participation. The embassy public affairs officer (PAO) worked with the KDOD PAO equivalent and prepared press releases to inform the public about the US military equipment and why it was in Kenya. The objective was to avoid media allegations about American military construction. Relations with the local populace and authorities were addressed from the beginning of the planning process and enhanced via the initiative of unit leadership and individuals. Following introductions in the capital with the Department of Defence leadership, the senior Kenyan civil authorities in the exercise area were informed of all planned activities and their support and suggestions were solicited. The material and financial benefit to the community were apparent and helped in gaining support.

### ***Intelligence and Security***

Information about Kenya that is available in the U.S. is more extensive than perhaps any other African country. Therefore, answers to questions about the country should be readily available and the fact that they remained unanswered following a PDSS indicates the need for a better understanding of how to access information databases and the intelligence system. Answers and reassurance to the 416th headquarters were provided by direct telephone conversations with the KUSLO. Although very expensive relative to reading a report, it provided immediate answers to general officers' questions. This exercise pointed out to this unit the different types of information requirements that exist for a combined peacetime construction and humanitarian project. The process of IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield) is applicable if one focuses on the mission and re-defines the nature of the "enemy". The early dispatch of logisticians (supply, maintenance and transport), contracting officers, medical personnel and civil affairs experts is invaluable to gaining the answers.

### ***Conclusion***

This ERC project constructed a live fire training facility, two 80 person dormitories, two water wells and immunized thousands of people against life threatening diseases, on time and within budget. Tangible improvement to the host nation's equipment readiness and soldiers skills and the American engineer's skills were clearly evident to all participants. The true success was an intangible improvement in Kenya-U.S. military relations and a demonstration to the government of Kenya the value of that relationship. This improvement can be measured by the conduct of other US-Kenya exercises in FY96 and Kenyan planning for and acceptance of proposed ERC projects and combined training exercises for FY1997-99. Greater participation on the part of other Kenyan units and a broader range of exercises will achieve the CINC's objective of working with a viable coalition partner. This exercise also contributed to the positive US Department of Defense perception of the Kenyan military's potential for contributions to larger forces. The combination of these results reflect the success of the intangible mission of improving international relations.

The weapon of combined exercises in the arsenal of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense must remain on the frontline and members of the American Army must remain ready to use it. In so doing the U.S. Army will achieve its desired training on Mission Essential Tasks and achieve greater efficiencies in international relations via this military to military interaction.

---

## ***Endnotes***

<sup>1</sup>US Department of Defense, US Central Command Regulation 415-2, *Exercise Related Construction in the USCENTCOM AOR*, dated 15 June 1995, 2.[BACK](#)

<sup>2</sup> US Central Command Regulation 415-2, p. 2. This regulation further clarifies the ERC project purpose by stating " ERC projects complement and enhance the USCENTCOM Exercise Program. Projects will be developed to enhance the effectiveness of exercise activities, reduce overall exercise costs, enhance safety, and/or improve training of engineer forces. ERC may be accomplished by U.S. troops, combined U.S.-host nation engineer forces, or by contractors... Where an ERC project is planned in a country eligible for HCA, an HCA construction project should be planned in conjunction with the ERC project.  
[BACK](#)

<sup>3</sup>The CENTCOM is represented in the host nation of Kenya by the Kenya U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO). This office of five military personnel of all three services represents the U.S. military's (CENTCOM) interests and administers the US government's security assistance programs. The KUSLO also has the responsibility to support all US military activities and interests in Kenya. The senior KUSLO officer offers input, counsel and advice to the Ambassador and embassy country team regarding the military perspective or viewpoint of US government policy vis-a-vis the host nation and region.[BACK](#)

<sup>4</sup> United States military assistance to Kenya in the 1980's included Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) loans for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases and International Military Education and Training (IMET) allocations. International Military Education and Training is a program by which foreign military personnel attend US military schools. The IMET funds averaged over one million dollars a year for 1986-90. MAP and FMF funding exceeded \$250 million dollars for the period 1975 to present. [BACK](#)

<sup>5</sup>Captain Basil Piazza, Assistant S-3, 368th Engineer Battalion, interview by author, 3 December 1996. [BACK](#)

<sup>6</sup> Members of the first PDSS included 416th Engineer Command (Forward) LNO's, 368th Engineer Battalion Executive Officer, S-3, Assistant S-3 and S-4, a representative from TRANSCOM and medical officer. What was most notably lacking was a representative from the MTMC. See the Joint Unit Lessons Learned System (Joint Unit Lessons Learned System (JULLS) Long Report, JULLS Number 00349-85976 for comments from the 368th Engineer Battalion's NCOs that felt their representation would have enhanced substantially their understanding of the concept of the operation and what to expect. Host nation offices that should also have been contacted included the Ministry of Health to discuss the MEDCAP. [BACK](#)

<sup>7</sup> The PDSS#1 also learned that in Kenya "assault course" is analogous to the American Army's "obstacle course" and therefore the correct terminology for the ERC project would be "Infantry Squad Battle Course". [BACK](#)

<sup>8</sup> Colonel General Staff of the Kenya Army, conversations with the author January-March 1996 and Kenya Army Engineer units' commanders, conversations with the author July 1995 to April 1996.[BACK](#)

<sup>9</sup> An ERC project is built in support of an US military training exercise. This ERC project is intended to support US exercises in Kenya. These Special Forces exercises were the first to use the facility.[BACK](#)

<sup>10</sup> The words "support to" the exercise were constantly avoided in order to reinforce the fact that this is a combined exercise, one which the Kenya Army or KDOD have assigned to its subordinate units. Therefore, "participation in" rather than "support to" the exercise was constantly emphasized.[BACK](#)